Such a huge inflow of funds has raised concerns that these funds were given without any accountability, as the end uses not being documented, and that large portions were used to suppress civilians' human rights and to purchase weapons to contain domestic problems like the Balochistan unrest. In December , The Spectato r reported that Pakistan is winning its war on terror. The Guardian reported that in , Narendra Modi , Prime Minister of India referred to Pakistan as the "mothership of terrorism", as part of a reprised campaign to increase international pressure on Pakistan for allegedly harboring and supporting militant groups.
In August , The Guardian reported that as part of a new US strategy in Afghanistan by the Trump administration , more pressure was to be put on Pakistan over alleged support for insurgent groups, with President Trump saying in a televised statement that "we can no longer be silent about Pakistan's safe havens for terrorist organisations, the Taliban and other groups that pose a threat to the region and beyond. We are fighting militants and have conducted many ground and aerial operations and destroyed their sanctuaries.
We want to eradicate them physically and ideologically. As part of a regional approach, Trump said he would encourage India to play more of a role whom are already providing economic and humanitarian aid to Afghanistan , former officials and analysts have pointed out that the fear of a greater Indian presence in Afghanistan was the justification used by Pakistan's military and intelligence leaders to maintain backing for Afghan militants, as a buffer against Indian influence.
With the logistics and air support of the United States, the Pakistani Army captured or killed numerous al-Qaeda operatives such as Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. In , a politically instable Pakistan emerged as a new global hub for anti-West militancy, but, because of the constant threat of US attacks, recruits were reportedly more likely to spend their time under instruction and in training than carrying out assertive action.
In his report on the matter, focusing on an alarming influx of European extremists, Reuters security correspondent William Maclean wrote,. Long a favored destination of British militants of Pakistani descent, Pakistan's northwestern tribal areas are now attracting Arabs and Europeans of Arab ancestry who three years ago would probably have gone to Iraq to fight U. With the Iraq war apparently winding down, security sources say, the lure for these young men is to fight U.
One consequence: Western armies in Afghanistan increasingly face the possibility of having to fight their own compatriots.
He added that the matter was likely to surface in a meeting on 6 May between United States President Barack Obama , Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari and Afghan President Hamid Karzai , the first-mentioned looking to bring an end to the employment of Pakistan's tribal zones as a launching pad for al Qaeda activity around the world. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Terrorist attacks in Pakistan since Retrieved 18 December Seeking Security in an Insecure World 2nd ed.
Retrieved 28 August Al Qaeda is seeking to reinfiltrate the ranks of Iraqi Sunni insurgents from its base in Syria. The U.
Pakistan Has No More Excuses for Supporting Terrorism
Sign in Subscribe. Implicit in this assumption is the belief that the militants will not seek to expand their sphere of influence east of the Indus river. It should be noted however that even in the most recent poll, fewer than one in two support military action. The data above show that, at least up until March , Pakistanis were deeply ambivalent about the best way to contend with those groups which Pakistanis nearly universally see as a threat, with respondents preferring political reform of the militant-affected areas and peace deals over military action.
Despite these enduring trends, recent polling data from May suggest that some important shifts seem to have occurred. At that time, many Pakistanis were hopeful that the deal would in fact bring peace as evidenced by the IRI data. By May , however, the militants had continued their march into Buner, another settled district in closer proximity to Islamabad. This signaled that the militants would not confine themselves to the historical areas of chaos west of the Indus River.
In the meantime, video footage of a young woman being beaten in public by the Pakistani Taliban surfaced amidst some controversy and speculation about its authenticity. In the wake of these events, the army moved swiftly to displace the militants from Buner and Swat. In doing so, they also displaced millions of civilians; between these operations and those in Bajaur and other parts of the FATA, more than three million civilians have been displaced. This optimism should be subject to important caveats.
Afghanistan’s Terror Threat Is Much Bigger Than the Taliban
Thus these questions, while similar, cannot be strictly compared. Second, there is no way of confirming that changes in public opinion were in fact caused by these events although it is highly likely given the degree of public outrage precipitated by the fall of Buner. Figure 7: Provinces—How much confidence do you have in the way that the military is handling the Pakistani Taliban?
Fifteen percent either declined to answer or did not have an opinion. NWFP has experienced sustained if brutal and devastating army operations which have demolished vast swathes of residential areas and displaced millions of persons fleeing the army-led and militant-led violence. These realities notwithstanding, a solid majority of respondents in the NWFP evinced some degree of confidence. Recall that Baluchistan and Sindh have seen virtually no Pakistani Taliban-related violence. The Punjab had the lowest percentage believing that the deal was the right thing to do. Opinion was divided in the NWFP, with nearly equal numbers believing it was the right thing to do or a mistake.
The PIPA May survey data indicated that an important change had occurred in Pakistani public attitudes toward the Pakistani Taliban and military action against them. Nonetheless, it remains to be seen whether these attitudes will persist as the army launches new offensives into South Waziristan and as the militants redouble their efforts to terrorize the public throughout the NWFP and Punjab.
As of August , residents have been returning to Buner and Swat; however, many remain dubious about security and have refused to return, an issue that is even more true for those who fled Bajaur.
War on Terror - Wikipedia
Wealthy landlords from Swat whose land was seized by the Pakistani Taliban and redistributed to the needy remain unwilling to return. Worse, this has created a class of beneficiaries who are beholden to the Pakistani Taliban for giving them land seized from the landlords. Moreover, while this shift in attitudes toward appeasing the militants through peace deals is important, its modest magnitude should be kept in mind.
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Similarly, Pakistanis have not warmed entirely toward military action against the militants; instead, they have become more ambivalent compared to previous staunch opposition evidenced in earlier polls. Finally, as the discussion of interprovincial differences suggests, while many U. Clearly there is a wide divergence in public views about these issues—variations which appear related to different provincial experiences of proximity to war, inefficacy of state institutions, violence and intimidation.
This is in addition to other demographic, socioeconomic and social differences that exist across populations in the four provinces. See C. Christine Fair and Seth G. Pakistani views of militant groups operating in India and Afghanistan have been explored elsewhere by the author; see, for example, C.
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These questions pertain to their attitudes to numerous militant groups operating in Pakistan, including Al Qaeda, the Taliban, various askari tanzeems engaged over Kashmir, sectarian militant groups and ethnic militant movements such as the insurgency in Baluchistan and previous conflicts in Sindh. Indian police, women and children of armed forces personnel, civilian targets such as parliament and national assemblies.
The survey was conducted from 12 to 18 September, just before President Pervez Musharraf declared a six-week state of emergency and before the assassination of Benazir Bhutto. The bulk of this essay derives from analyses of these data. Christine Fair, et al. All interviewing was conducted in Urdu. A total of 1, face-to-face interviews were conducted across sixty-four primary sampling units in rural areas and thirty-six in urban areas.
In order to properly capture opinion in Baluchistan a multi-ethnic, sparsely populated province , it was oversampled, using fifteen primary sampling units; results were then weighted back to reflect true proportions among provinces. Interviews were conducted between 17 and 28 May